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COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS WHO
CONTINUE THE BUSINESS OF A CORPORATION
AFTER FORFEITURE OF ITS CHARTER
Borbein Young & Co. v. Cirese, 401 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)
Defendants were officers and directors of a firm of trailer manufacturers
incorporated under the laws of Missouri which in 1954 forfeited its charter.
The defendants continued to operate as they had prior to the forfeiture,
and in the years following the loss of charter, they purchased parts and
materials from the plaintiff company until 1960 when the defendants' com-
pany was adjudged bankrupt. At this time they owed plaintiff over $10,900
on open account. The plaintiff sued the individual officers and directors of
the defunct company who were in office at the time of the forfeiture claim-
ing that they were personally liable for all debts incurred by them because
they had continued to operate the business after the loss of its charter.
Plaintiff's suit was based upon a Missouri statute which makes the
officers and directors who are in office at the time of forfeiture trustees of
the company for the purpose of winding up its affairs.' The trial court
found against all four of the defendants for the full amount of the debt
owed plus interest. Two appealed, claiming they were neither officers nor
directors of the company at the time the debt to the plaintiff was incurred,
and therefore, should not be held liable. The appellate court held that the
personal liability of the defendants arose from their neglect of duty as trus-
tees to liquidate the corporation and distribute its assets at the time of charter
forfeiture. Having failed in this duty and continuing to operate the business
of the corporation, they became individually liable for debts even though
they might have terminated their active participation prior to incurrence
of the obligation.'
1. [T]he directors and officers in office when any such forfeiture occurs shall be the
trustees of the corporation, who shall have full authority to wind up its business
and affairs, sell and liquidate its property and assets, pay its debts and obligations
and to distribute the net assets among the shareholders; and such trustees as such
shall have power to sue for and recover the debts and property due such corpora.
tion, describing it by its corporate name, and may be sued as such; and such trus-
tees shall be jointly and severally responsible to the creditors and shareholders of
such corporation to the extent of its property and effects that shall have come
into their hands. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 351.525 (1959).
2. Borbein Young & Co. v. Cirese, 401 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966). How-
ever, in this particular case the court did find that there was sufficient evidence pre-
sented to show that the appellants were officers and directors of the corporation at the
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The court in Borbein Young & Co. v. Cirese,3 relied upon Leibson v.
Henry' as the original authority for the interpretation of the Missouri statute
in question. Leibson held, on similar facts, that the officers and directors of
a corporation which had forfeited its charter became trustees of said cor-
poration with full power to liquidate the corporation's affairs for the benefit
of the stockholders and creditors. However, as trustees, they were power-
less to transact any of the corporation's business, except to wind up its
affairs; and if they did act beyond their powers and continue the business
as had been done prior to forfeiture, the defendants were to be held per-
sonally liable for any obligations incurred by them in such unlawful as-
sumption of power.'
The court in Borbein Young expanded on this decision, explaining that
the vital date as to the personal liability of officers and directors is the date
the charter was forfeited, not the date the debt was incurred0 Therefore,
if the defendant was an officer or director at the time of forfeiture of the
charter and subsequently resigned his post (prior to the incurrence of the
debt) he would still be held personally liable for the obligation. This is
a reasonable interpretation of the statute if the law of trustees is applied.
A trustee, having manifested his intent to assume the trust duties! can only
be relieved of them by a resignation which is accepted by the beneficiaries
or by a court of competent jurisdiction, and cannot merely resign on his own
time the debt was incurred. While this finding renders the court's interpretation of the
statute technically dicta, nevertheless, the emphasis used indicates probable adherence in
the future.
3. 401 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
4. 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W.2d 310 (1947).
5. Leibson v. Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W.2d 310 (1947).
6. The personal liability of officers and directors of a dissolved corporation arises
from their neglect of duty as trustees to liquidate the corporation and distribute its
assets at the time of charter forfeiture. If they fail in that statutory duty and un-
lawfully continue to operate the business of the corporation after its dissolution
they would remain individually liable for corporation debts even though incurred
at a time subsequent to their active participation in business affairs on behalf of
the corporation. So it is that the vital date ... is the date of forfeiture-not when
"the account sued on was contracted." Borbein Young & Co. v. Cirese, 401 S.W.2d
940, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
But see Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79
(1946) (directors held not to be liable for a note renewed after charter forfeiture on a
debt which had been incurred prior to the forfeiture). Contra, Hicks v. Continental Car-
bon Paper Mfg. Co., 380 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curiam, 382 S.W.2d
910 (Tex. 1964) (director who had retired prior to incurrence of the debt held not to
be liable for it).
7. Such manifestation is implicit in acceptance of a position as a corporate officer or
director since upon their election they are charged with knowledge of any duties they
may incur because of their position. Consequently, an officer or director of a Missouri
corporation who continues in the same role after forfeiture of the corporate charter is, by
statute, considered to have accepted a trusteeship.
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initiative.8 The same would seem to apply to the trust created by the statute
in the instant case.'
Corporations are creations of statutes and it is within the almost unlim-
ited power of the legislature to prescribe rules for their creation and dissolu-
tion. It is likewise for the legislature to determine what penalties shall be
imposed on the corporation and the officers who manage it for failure to
comply with laws regarding payment of license taxes. Such penalties may
be imposed personally against the officers or directors if it is so desired."0
The various rationales for the enactment of such statutes include the
desire to prevent fraud on the stockholders and creditors of the corpora-
tion,"1 to insure prompt payment of franchise taxes to the states, 2 and to
abrogate the common law rule that all property of a dissolved corporation
escheats to the state, leaving the creditor no one against whom he can en-
force his claim.1 3 Since personal liability for all debts incurred may attach,
these statutes are highly penal in nature' 4 and must be strictly construed by
8. In re Lorrees Trust Estate, 24 N.J. Super. 604, 95 A.2d 435 (1953); In re Kel-
logg, 214 N.Y. 460, 108 N.E. 844 (1915); G. BooET, TRUSTS § 31 (4th ed. 1963);
cf. Riedell v. Stuart, 151 Okla. 266, 2 P.2d 929 (1931).
9. Note 1 supra. This reasoning would also be valid if the statute provided that the
last officers and directors of a corporation which has forfeited its charter shall be liable
as co-partners. The reason for this is that if a partner wishes to withdraw from a firm
and divest himself of partnership liability, he must give notice to all persons who had
previously dealt with the partnership. Neal v. M. E. Smith & Co., 116 Fed. 20 (8th Cir.
1902). Hence, in the principle case, a partnership could have been formed without
any specific written agreement. Fisher v. Colorado Central Power Co., 94 Col. 218, 29
P.2d 641 (1934). And since the burden is on the retiring member to give notice to all
persons with whom the firm has previously had dealings that he has withdrawn, the
defendant should have given such notice to avoid liability. In the Matter of Hare, 205
F. Supp. 881 (D. Md. 1962). Since notice was not given the court could have properly
found the two defendants liable.
10. Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 119 Col. 62, 66, 201 P.2d 372, 375 (1948).
11. Leibson v. Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 962, 204 S.W.2d 310, 316 (1947); accord,
Poritzky v. Wachtel, 176 Misc. 633, 27 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1941). The reason for this
need is that upon forfeiture of the charter, the corporation becomes a non-existent entity.
Riedell v. Stuart, 151 Okla. 266, 2 P.2d 929 (1931). It would thus be unconscionable
to permit the directors the defense that the corporation continues to enjoy a de facto
status and insulates them from personal liability. In the Matter of Hare, 205 F. Supp.
881, 884 (D. Md. 1962); Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Connell, 149 Kan. 118, 86 P.2d
545 (1939); cf. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, 19 N.W. 911 (1884). Such liability is to
the creditor and not to the corporation. Bailey v. O'Neal, 92 Ark. 327, 122 S.W. 503
(1909).
12. Isbell v. Gulf Union Oil Co., 147 Tex. 6, 209 S.W.2d 762 (1948).
13. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Winschel, 88 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); accord,
Nudelman v. Thimbles, Inc., 225 Mo. App. 553, 40 S.W.2d 475 (1931).
14. Sheffield v. Nobles, 378 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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the courts." Their application is, thus, restricted to situations which are
expressly described in the particular statute.1 6
All jurisdictions provide for an involuntary dissolution of a corporation
by, or on behalf of, the state on specified grounds,1 but few states have
enacted statutes providing for joint and several liability of officers and di-
rectors who continue the business after such forfeiture. 8 In the absence of a
post-forfeiture statute, some states enforce personal liability based on other
principles of law: the liability of an agent who contracts for a non-existent
principal, 9 or a trustee who exceeds his statutory powers .2  However, not
all states which impose liability necessarily include those who were directors
at the time of forfeiture. Instead, for the director to be held liable, the
debt must have been "created or incurred, with his knowledge, approval
and consent. ..."" When the defendant directors did not take any part
in the creation of, and did not approve a debt for goods purchased after
the charter forfeiture, they were not held liable;22 but if they did approve
15. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Winschel, 88 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), held
that the statute in question imposes partnership iabilty only upon directors of a cor-
poration who undertake to carry on the business of the corporation after its right to do
business has been forfeited for failure to pay franchise tax. But cf. Struders Oil Co. v.
Bienfang, 22 N.J.L. 238, 4 A.2d 787 (1939) (the fact that the directors were unaware of
the dissolution of the corporation does not affect their liability under the statute).
16. See Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d
79 (1946). It has been held, however, that this type of statute will place personal liabil-
ity upon a director who has continued the business of a corporation which has forfeited
its charter even though the charter has been reinstated. Moore v. Rommel, 233 Ark. 989,
350 S.W.2d 190 (1961) (restoration to corporate status restores the corporation only to
the position it was in at the time of payment of the tax); Wallace v. Pere Marquette
Fiberglass Boat Co., 2 Mich. App. 605, 141 N.W.2d 383 (1966) (officers and directors
of a corporation are liable for any debts contracted during the period of neglect to file
the annual report); Poritzky v. Wachtel, 176 Misc. 633, 27 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1941) (to
allow a director to avoid post-forfeiture liability after charter reinstatement would
allow him to shift the personal liability the law would otherwise impose upon him).
But see Spector v. Hart, 139 So. 2d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) which held that
restoration shall be effective from the date of cancellation of the charter. Since the pur-
pose of the statute is soley the raising of revenue for the state, it would be inequitable
to permit third persons who had dealt with the corporation during the period of non-
existence to lose their cause of action against the directors merely because a revival
statute allowed reinstatement to corporate status.
17. Statutes collected in ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. § 87, Comment % l 2.02
& 6 (1960).
18. E.g., Mlicr. STAT. ANN. § 21.87 (1963); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.194
(1951); Tax. Rv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 12.14 (1960).
19. Struders Oil Co. v. Bienfang, 22 N.J.L. 238, 4 A.2d 787 (1939).
20. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Connell, 149 Kan. 118, 86 P.2d 545 (1939).
21. E.g., Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 12.14 (1960).
22. Groce-Parrish Co. v. Yoker, 81 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); cf. Agua
Dulce Supply Co. v. Chapman Milling Co., 37 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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of a debt, although they did not create it, knowledge of the facts was pre-
sumed and the directors were held liable for it."
Keeping in mind the purposes of the statute24 and the fact that other
jurisdictions do not enforce personal liability on directors who were in
office at the time of charter forfeiture and who subsequently resigned their
position, it is questionable whether the harsh interpretation placed on the
Missouri statute is a proper one to achieve the ends the legislature had in
mind. The statute was not passed merely to place liability on someone who
may have committed a wrong, but rather to give the injured person (be
it the State or an individual creditor) a remedy against the ones who im-
properly gained possession of his goods or money. Thus, the statute must
be interpreted so as to do equity between the parties; that is, to see that
the defrauded creditor has someone from whom to seek redress, while, at
the same time, protecting one who may have the appearance of a wrong-
doer, but who is actually an innocent party. It follows that had the two
defendants in Borbein Young been found not to have been officers or
directors at the time the obligation was incurred, they should not have been
held liable for the debt.
If the statute was enacted to prevent a fraud on the creditors of the
corporation, " then why should one who has had no part in the perpe-
tration of a fraud and who, at worst, simply disassociated himself from the
corporation, be held liable? Surely so long as the injured creditor has some-
one to look to for a remedy there is no reason to place liability on one who
did not act in concert with the others or who may not have had knowl-
edge of the breach of trust.26 At least one state has gone so far as to hold
that the purpose of the statute is to prevent wrongful acts of culpable
officers and directors of a corporation and to protect the public, not to
punish officials who have taken no part in the malfeasance of the other
directors." In an analogous situation-pre-incorporation liability-most
state statutes provide that a director shall not be held personally liable for
pre-incorporation acts which co-directors may have ratified, if he properly
dissents from them in writing to the appropriate authority, or if he merely
records his dissent in the minutes of the directors' meeting at which the
23. First Nat'l Bank v. Silberstein, 391 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), ajJ'd, 398
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1966). But see Bailey v. O'Neal, 92 Ark. 327, 122 S.W. 503 (1909).
24. Text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
25. Leibson v. Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W.2d 310 (1947).
26. Hicks v. Continental Carbon Paper Mfg. Co., 380 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
27. Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79
(1946).
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proposed illegal action was discussed. 2 Cases supporting this proposition
have held that equitable principles may not be disregarded, and that when
the violation of the statute has not been the direct and proximate cause of
the injury complained of the non-participating director cannot be held
personally liable.20 The liability of a director should be the same for post-
forfeiture acts of other directors as for pre-incorporation misdeeds of co-
directors."
If the statute had been enacted for the purpose of raising revenue for
the state and insuring prompt payment,"' again there is no need to impose
liability on one who participates in no further business of the corporation
which is to be dissolved. The only penalty that should be imposed on such
person is one for not completing his statutory duty of winding up the affairs
of the corporation. In imposing this penalty, the courts should determine
if the accused director, who claims innocence, has extinguished his possible
remedies32 to force the other directors to liquidate the affairs of the business.
Such acts on his part would show good faith in his actions thus giving the
courts just cause for limiting his liability. Even if the director has not
sought such remedies, no more than a fine should be imposed on him for
28. Statutes collected in ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. ACT. § 43e, Comment gff 2.02 (5)
& 6 (1960).
29. See Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 6 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1925); Third Nat'l
Bank v. Martin, 219 Ky. 579, 293 S.W. 1064 (1927) (one cannot be held liable merely
because another has violated the statute). A person's violation must be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's loss for him to be held liable for such injury.
30. Text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
31. Isbell v. Gulf Union Oil Co., 147 Tex. 6, 209 S.W.2d 762 (1948).
32. There are two possible remedies available to the director: obtaining an injunction
to enjoin his fellow directors from carrying on the business of the coporation and seeking
a writ of mandamus ordering such directors to wind up the affairs of the corporation.
An injunction is a proper remedy if the remedy at law is inadequate or if irreparable
harm would befall the person seeking the injunction if it were not granted, e.g., Balti-
more Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1943), but it will not be granted
merely for an apprehension or fear a loss, Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 55 F.
Supp. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1944), aff'd, 154 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946). If the court finds, how-
ever, that a situation such as the one presented in the Borbein Young case is one in
which there is only an apprehension and no irreparable damage is imminent, the director
may succeed in suing for a writ of mandamus.
A writ of mandamus may be issued at the court's discretion since "it is . . .the ap-
propriate remedy to enforce the performance of duties imposed on artificial bodies,
including ... private corporations." F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, JR., EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES § 192 (1926). It is proper for a corporation to obtain a writ of mandamus
to require officers to perform ministerial duties owed to the corporation. Cf. Lydia E.
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 305 Mass. 213, 25 N.E.2d 332 (1940). Also one may
bring mandamus to enforce payment of taxes owed by the corporation. Cf. Murphy
v. Jos. Hollander, Inc., 131 N.J.L. 165, 34 A.2d 780 (1943).
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neglect to close out the business."
Concerning the abrogation of the common law rule,"' the purpose of
the statute is to prevent the property from escheating to the state, thus
providing the injured party a right of action against the persons who pre-
sently have control of the property. It would therefore be illogical to
allow him to maintain a suit against the individuals who have had no part
in the preservation of the corporation's business. Since the directors who
have continued doing business have wrongfully persisted in using the cor-
poration's property (which otherwise would have escheated to the state), it
seems that it should be only these persons who are held liable to the de-
frauded creditor.
If taken literally, the Missouri statute could be interpreted as the court has
done, but in terms of fairness and equity, this cannot and should not be
considered to be the legislative intention. The words "when any such for-
feiture occurs" should have been interpreted to mean that the directors
and officers who were in office at the time of forfeiture shall become trustees
for the purpose of dissolution; but only those who contracted the post-
forfeiture debts while acting beyond the scope of their power shall be liable
for them. This interpretation would fulfill all of the purposes of the sta-
tute and still meet the requirements of fairness and equity."
33. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:702 (1950); M&. ANN. CoDE art. 23 § 86
(1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105.231 (1939).
34. Text accompanying note 13 supra.
35. United States v. Fleisher Eng'r. & Constr. Co., 30 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. N.Y.
1939) (statutes are not to be so literally construed as to defeat the purpose of the legis-
lature, and should receive a construction so as to avoid an unjust conclusion); Com-
missioner v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1943) (common sense plays its part in con-
struing statutes).
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